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Introduction 
 
“Effective multilateralism” has been a central political reference point of the European 
Union’s (EU) external action since the EU’s rebirth after the split over Iraq in 
February/March 2003. Its premier was in the first proposal of the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) at the Thessalonica Summit in July 2003. Afterwards it was published in the 
European Commissions path-breaking communication about the relations between the 
European Union and the United Nations (UN) which was subtitled “the choice of 
multilateralism” (10.09.2003, COM (2003) 526 final). Another political directory, the ESS, 
told us in December 2003 that one of the three main goals of the EU’s foreign policy 
strategy is the creation of an “effective multilateral system”. In the ESS “effective 
multilateralism” is used to promise the EU’s strong commitment for a multilateral world 
order with functioning international organisations. To reach this purpose the EU positions 
itself as a frontrunner in strengthening the multilateral system in general and the 
effectiveness of international organisations in particular. For the EU “effective 
multilateralism” in, with and within international organisations is the foundation of a system 
of global governance, so is laid down in the ESS. Therefore the term is used to label the 
EU’s activities in the UN-family and to characterise the relations with the UN in the wider 
context of global governance. It is the political argument for the EU’s commitment in 
military crisis management, side by side with UN peacekeepers. The UN in turn speaks of 
multilateralism to call for the EU’s loyalty and partnership. 
 
This paper questions these rhetorical denominations critically. It goes beyond the political 
declarations to analyse the degree and quality of “effective multilateralism” in reality in and 
with international organisations, using the example of UN-EU-relations in military crisis 
management. The paper aims to present and underline the following thesis: Multilateralism 
is under strain at all levels of UN-EU relations in crisis management. 
In order to provide a conceptual basis for the analysis one has to ask at first: How can 
multilateralism be operationalised? The theoretical approach of multilateralism serves as 
the starting point of the analysis and theoretical basis of the paper (Chapter 1). It is 
combined with some results of inter-organisational theory. The special EU-touch in 
“effective multilateralism” in comparison to the “UN-touch” is subject of Chapter 2. This 
analysis is necessary due to the meanwhile inflationary use of the term “effective 
multilateralism” in almost every CSFP context. Its content fluctuates. At one time it is 
characterised as the shibboleth of EU’s foreign policy (like in matters of the UN) and at the 
other time it is nothing more than an instrument for pursuing vital interests, filled with 
empty promises. Thus, the results of a discourse analysis are presented in this chapter. It 
shows the huge potential for friction between these partners because of a different focus 
on “effective multilateralism”. Are the institutional steps to a partnership in crisis 
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management as well as the operational collaboration in DR Congo (2003/2006/2009) 
and Chad/CAR (2008/2009) in line with “multilateralism”? is the concluding question that 
is answered in the paper (Chapter 3). 
1 Multilateralism: Theoretical approaches 
This chapter introduces the theoretical approaches to multilateralism. It helps to 
conceptualise the analyses of “effective multilateralism” in the context of UN-EU-relations. 
The neoliberal institutionalists who tried to understand the development of international 
institutions made the first steps on the way to define and operationalise “multilateralism”. 
Constructivist institutionalists who recognised that “norms matter” complemented their 
approach. This method is refined by the paradigms of social constructivism, especially by 
the construct of role models. Robert Keohane, John G. Ruggie and James Caporaso have 
been the leading minds in theorizing multilateralism since the early 1990s. Their main 
arguments are presented and further developed in this chapter. 
1.1 The institutionalist model 
Robert Keohane published the first internationally recognised definition of multilateralism 
shortly after the end of the bipolarity. It was the promising climate of a new beginning in 
world politics, the time to envision the potential of a new world order which motivated him 
as well as Ruggie and Caporaso to think about the contents of the increasingly used term 
“multilateralism”. He understood multilateralism as a “practice of co-ordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of 
institutions2.” (Keohane 1990: 731) Keohanes paradigm is still the common answer if one 
asks for a definition of “multilateralism” in political or academic circles.3 How is Keohanes 
concept to be understood? Keohane speaks of multilateralism as a specific form of 
interaction between a specific numbers of actors. Firstly one has to notice that the 
denseness of the interaction between the actors is marginal. It remains at the level of co-
ordinating policies. The actors do not have to cooperate permanently but to interact 
demand-oriented and on short term. Thus Keohanes multilateralism includes ad hoc-
coalitions of the willing (for instance during Iraq 2003) as well as the institutionalised 
cooperation in international organisations like the UN or NATO. Secondly Keohane 
concentrates on states as the central actors of the international system. He leaves the 
door open for further speculation about the quality of actorness of international institutions 
that have been discussed by the IR community since the early 1990s. Thirdly the haze of 
ignorance regarding the character of the relations between the states remains veiled. 
                                            
2 Institutions understood as „persistent and connected set of rules (...), that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain activity and shape expectations.“ (Keohane in Ruggie 1992: 570) 
3 Interview with a German diplomat, August 2009 in Berlin; outcome of a panel discussion about the question 
„What does multilateralism mean?“, UNA Germany December 2009 in Berlin.  
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Keohanes “multilateralism” includes all sorts of inter-national hierarchic and non-hierarchic 
constellations apart from unilateralism and bilateralism: the structural dependency within 
the Warsaw Pact is per definition as multilateral as the co-laboration of the Triple Entente, 
the marginally institutionalised Weimar Triangle or the highly institutionalised co-operation 
in the EU as a system sui generis. An imperial power that interacts “by denying the 
sovereignty of the subject states” (Ruggie 1992: 571) operates in Keohanes wide 
interpretation multilaterally too. The only statement that cannot be mistaken is the numeric 
quantification of multilateralism: It is nothing more than “bilateralism plus one” (Williams 
1995: 211). 
 
Such a vague explanation that misses the differentiation regarding the quality and the modi 
of multilateral interaction has almost no potential to serve as a conceptual framework for 
the empirical analysis of “effective multilateralism” and the inter-organisational UN-EU-
relations. 
 
John G. Ruggie responded to Keohanes definition and coined the term “multilateralism” in 
the IR. He is not only a political scientist but also a United Nations insider, who served as 
Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning under Kofi Annan. He knows 
multilateralism from the inside of an international organisation as well as from IR theory. 
Ruggie modified Keohanes definition in as far as he found out that not only interests but 
“norms matter!” in international relations. He criticised the core of Keohanes definition: “In 
short, the nominal definition of multilateralism misses the qualitative dimension of the 
phenomenon that makes the distinct.” (Ruggie 1992: 566) Led by his normative way of 
thinking he concluded that the defining nucleus of multilateralism is an intrinsic set of rules 
that orders the relations among the states. It includes the “generalized principles of 
conduct”, the “indivisibility among members of the collectivity” and “diffuse reciprocity”4 
(Ruggie 1992: 571). As Ruggie states, any interaction between more than two states 
must be defined as multilateral if it happens in a rule-led and non-discriminating climate. An 
institution has to be characterised as multilateral only if it fulfils Ruggies conditions. Thus 
Newman warns the academic community who analyses international institutional behaviour 
that “the concept of multilateralism should not be confused with or confined to formal 
international organizations.” (Newman 2007: 11) With his set of rules Ruggie generates 
clear test criteria for the study of contested multilateral interaction. But his concept 
remains in the area of inter-national interactions as well as Keohanes. States are the 
actors of multilateralism. Moreover, following Ruggies definition, multilateralism is also 
nothing more than an attribute to an activity (Caporaso 1993: 53 ff.). His way of 
multilateralism makes high demands on the states behaviour: states have to coordinate 
                                            
4 Diffuse reciprocity differs from specific reciprocity because „actors expect to benefit in a long run and over 
many issues (diffuse r.; M.S.), rather than every time on every issue (specific r.; M.S.).“ (Caporaso 1992: 602). 
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their interests without discriminating the partners and have to interact without the 
guarantee of immediate and relative gains. Therefore Ruggie identifies the limits of his 
concept himself and states that he knows “no good explanation (…) why states should 
complicate their lives in this manner within (…) the currently ascendant logic of 
instrumental rationality.” (Ruggie 1992: 584) 
 
Ruggie and Keohane stay concentrated on inter-state level in their more recent 
publications and still define multilateralism as a form of interaction in the inter-national 
system (e.g. Keohane 2006; Ruggie 1993/1998). These concepts help to identify 
multilateral action in the international system and to categorise the UN-EU-interactions. But 
both researchers do not look left and right like the social constructivists do. Multilateralism 
in the institutionalist meaning is only an instrument of state’s actions. But in reality 
“effective multilateralism” is perceived as a goal of EU´s and UN´s external activity. These 
conclusions lead to social constructivism. 
1.2 The constructivist model 
In the late 1990s a new approach found its way in IR theory and gave birth to an entirely 
new thinking: the social constructivism. The constructivism solved Ruggies instrumental 
problem in going beyond rational paradigms. Moreover it opened a way to remain not in 
describing multilateralism as a sort of interaction and a means of states (Martin 1992: 
767 and Bertram 2005: 71). It allowed perceiving multilateralism as an attribute to a 
specific identity (at first Caporaso 1993: 53 ff.) and as an end in itself.  
Following the constructivist paradigms of co-construction and the endogeneity of norms, 
some actors become multilateralists because they internalise and habitualise the 
normative principles of multilateral interaction via endogenous processes of socialisation 
and discourse. Multilateralism in the mind of these actors is not only a specific form of 
interaction and an instrument to pursue its interests. It is their core principle of external 
activity, the central “view of politics” and the natural “way of life” (Voicu 2003: 50 and 
Groom 2006: 460). The EU as well as the UN can be classified as such mutilateral models. 
Both are a natu multilaterally organised; both (try to) implement the norms of 
multilateralism internally; both (try to) confer their internal principles of multilateralism 
upon the external area; both promote multilateralism as an essential element of a system 
of good global governance and define it as an end in itself; both perceive themselves and 
each other as multilateralist role models. Actors with a multilateralist identity understand 
multilateralism as a core principle of the international system that transports the idea of an 
equitable world order. Multilateralism is seen as a normative piece of the worlds peace 
puzzle. 
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1.3 Synthesis 
In synthesis of the institutionalist and constructivist approaches a helpful construct of ideas 
can be presented: 
 
Multilateralism is a norm-led interaction in the international system. It is an instrument for 
pursuing interests. Multilateral interaction may appear in form of co-ordination, co-
laboration or co-operation and more or less institutionalised.  
Moreover, multilateralism is a political goal for these actors who socialised and habitualised 
the norm “multilateralism” as constitutive component of their role sets, labelled the 
multilateralists. Multilateralism becomes therefore an end in itself.  
All in all one can ascertain, that multilateralism, understood as interaction as well as 
element of a role model, is a defining principle that constitutes the system of global 
governance.  
 
This concept helps to differentiate between some forms of interaction, to identify 
multilateral actions as well as multilateralists. But it has its limits. It is far too unspecific for 
a detailed analysis. It merely looks after state action and ignores the other actors of global 
governance, for instance the international organisations.  
This shortfall is solved by including the theories of inter-organisational governance.5 During 
my dissertation project I worked intensively about inter-organisational governance, 
especially the cooperative and competitive behaviour of organisations. After clarifying the 
organisations actors’ quality in taking recourse to organisational theories (e.g. 
Barnett/Finnemore 1999/2004) it emerged that organisations interact if utilitarian 
incentives and/or common characteristics of the organisational identity occurs. Their 
cooperative and competitive behaviour is comparable with states behaviour. In today’s 
dense institutional spaces in the midst of complex global governance inter-organisational 
relations are not less rivalling than inter-national relations (Biermann 2007: 14). But unlike 
states international organisations have in most cases one element of their role set in 
common that may stimulate the willingness to cooperate: they are all a natu 
multilateralists. 
In the context of the paper one has to recognise additionally, that the theoretical 
approaches explain only the noun “multilateralism” and not the adjective „effective“. The 
adjective is the key to understand and conceptualise „effective multilateralism” in and with 
international organisations. In short, what is missing is the EU/UN-touch. 
                                            
5 Due to contents constraints these theories cannot be presented in this paper. 
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2 Effective Multilateralism: Empirical concepts 
At the time of starting the cooperation in military crisis management, born out of the 
shared experience of the inter-national split during Iraq 2003 and the common willingness 
to strengthen themselves and the regime of peace operations, EU and UN began 
simultaneously to robe their global interests in the cloak of “effective multilateralism”. It has 
been a central reference for all inter-organisational activities, especially in the young policy 
field of military crisis management since 2003. Multilateralism is a promising concept for 
UN-EU-relations: EU’s and UN’s multilaterally organised bodies, their multilateral modus of 
action and their multilateral thinking combined with their corresponding normative 
worldviews and comparable political visions of an integrated approach in conflict 
management are a solid basis to work for peace. Their mutual commitment to 
multilateralism builds a confident inter-organisational milieu. Weiss explains: “For the 
European Union, multilateralism constitutes a matter of principle, a nonnegotiable starting 
point. And the same is true for the role of the United Nations.” (Weiss 2006) 
But the contents of the term are less obvious than one may believe in the face of its 
inflationary use. As I made the case that different understandings of the term sow the seed 
of frictions in UN-EU-relations at all levels of cooperation, I examined the use of “effective 
multilateralism” in EU- and UN-documents via discourse analysis to find similarities and 
discrepancies. The leading questions were: What is the special EU-touch when the EU 
speaks of “effective multilateralism” in conjunction with “international organisations/UN”? 
What is the special UN-touch when the UN uses the term in connection with “international 
partners/EU”? Based upon the results I examined if the variations in understanding 
effective multilateralism have an impact on the institutional and operational level of UN-EU-
relations.  
Some outcomes of these studies are presented in this chapter. 
2.1 The EU touch 
The EU identifies “effective multilateralism” as an interaction in Ruggie’s tradition and as a 
means of foreign policy. The EU underlines the value of non-discriminating cooperation and 
commitment for the public good. Solana declared in this context: “If we want the world to 
work, we want multilateralism. But if we want multilateralism to work, then the powerful 
need to put their power behind it. A complex world needs multilateral bodies.” (Solana 
20.12.2004) Furthermore the EU realizes that multilateralism is an element of its role set, 
a central political goal and an end in itself. The chapter concentrates on this normative 
view, on the link to the UN and the explanation of the adjective “effective”. 
Normative view: In the ESS, in the EU Council speeches at the UN General Assembly and 
various other documents on foreign policy the EU emphasises the impact of multilateralism 
on world order. The EU declares a better world based on an “effective multilateralism” as 
major goal of its external activities. In the eyes of the EU security and prosperity in a world 
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of globalising threats and challenges depends more and more on an effective multilateral 
system (GA62-07.001EN 1.10.2007). Multilateralism is named together with its core 
values like human rights, the rule of law and the international law (S045/09 18.02.2009). 
The documents show that the EU perceives multilateralism as a recipe for curing the 
international system from the disease of crisis and conflict. 
The UN: What is remarkable in the EU’s perception is the strong commitment to the United 
Nations. The UN is labelled as the “linchpin”, “pivot”, “heart” and “centre of gravity” of the 
multilateral system (COM (2003) 526 final: 3; Ferrero-Waldner 8.12.2004; S002/07 
24.01.2007). “Effective multilateralism” and “the UN” are mostly named parallel as the two 
sides of one coin: “The E.U. is deeply committed to the U.N. (...) and to effective 
multilateralism as a central element of its external action.” (GA59-04-001EN 7.07.2004; 
GA60-05.001EN 22.07.2005; GA61-06-001EN 18.07.2006)6. The EU declares to build a 
solid global system under the umbrella of multilateralism via the support of the multilateral 
linchpin, combined with its various bilateral relations with powerful actors and on the basis 
of a more coherent CSFP/CSDP. In defining the UN as global pivot the EU presents a 
concept of multilateralism that focuses on the revival of the classic system of 
multilateralism, which was built after World War II.7  
Effectiveness: The EU has been combining the noun multilateralism with the adjective effective 
since 2003. Effectiveness is the key to notice the EU-touch of multilateralism in contrast to 
the UN’s contents. It is used in various ways. Firstly, central to the understanding is the 
conclusion of the Commission’s communication: “An active commitment to a effective 
multilateralism means more than a profession of faith.” (COM (2003) 526 final: 3). 
Multilateralism is effective if it is oriented on pro-active engagement and results. Moreover, 
multilateral action has to have “teeth” to be effective (Solana 20.12.2004). In regard to 
crisis management the metaphor “teeth” means that the EU has to be ready and willing to 
take military measures in the last resort if needed to solve the conflict (ESS 2003). 
Multilateralism has to be enforceable (Biscop/Drieskens 2005: 2). This interpretation is 
quite comparable to the US “assertive multilateralism” that was invented by Madeleine 
Albright during the Clinton administration. Additionally to its pro-active connotation it 
implied a pragmatic order of action: multilateralism if possible, unilateralism if necessary. 
Secondly, the term was born out of the conclusion that the classical multilateral system 
had to become effective. Multilateralism is an instrument to strengthen the weakened 
international system, e.g. the United Nations. For this reason one has to notice that 
effectiveness has not to be limited to the economic way of thinking, in short efficiencies. The 
                                            
6 The EU spoke at the GA 2002 of multilateralism without the defining adjective fort he last time: „The 
European Union reaffirms ist strong commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations.“ (GA57-02-
001EN 22.07.2002)  
7 This concept is criticised by Hettne/Soederbaum as old-fashioned and inadequate for a system of global 
governance where non-state actors take over the efforts of governance (Hettne/Soederbaum 2006: 229). 
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EU’s commitment to an efficient UN would only be a drop in the bucket. The EU that 
focuses on efficiency would have no motive to strengthen the UN, which is criticised 
strongly and persistently due to its inefficiency. Thirdly, the EU perceives itself as being 
responsible for the effectiveness of multilateralism. This self-perception is grounded in the 
EU’s image as one of the most powerful and influential “global actors” (ESS 2003: 1). It 
positions itself as a leader in the multilateral network of global governance due to its image 
as a model, true promoter and veritable supporter of multilateralism (COM (2003) 526 
final 10.09.2003: 9).  
These three arguments together lead to crucial questions: Would the EU choose to act in 
and with the UN if this commitment was expected to have small outcomes? Would the EU 
choose the linchpin UN as the partner in crisis management if the institutional spaces 
were denser and the forum shopping would provide the opportunity to co-operate with 
another crisis management organisation? Would the EU choose to inter-act with the UN if 
it was able to pursue its interests unilaterally? The answer to these questions must be 
verified through reality checks. All in all, the discourse analysis brought a glimpse of a 
utilitarian and economic strategic thinking to the surface. It illustrated that multilateral 
action must hold the promise of effectiveness to be chosen as adequate instrument of EU’s 
external action. Multilateralism is only one element of the toolbox of EU’s external action 
even though it is the preferred one. 
Apart from these general questions and assumptions, the focus on the UN in combination 
with the spotlight on effectiveness raises doubts on the concept’s consistency. Rationally 
argued, even the attempt to strengthen the UN profoundly has small chances to succeed. 
The history of UN peacekeeping teaches this lessons hundreds of times. Dealing with the 
UN means filling the huge capability gaps with the expectation of achieving not much. 
Therefore some questions come to mind: Is the link to the UN only an empty phrase? The 
study of the institutional and operational level sheds light on this issue. And even further: 
Will the EU stand by its (political) commitment to the UN? To respond to this question, one 
has to go back to the beginnings of the term “effective multilateralism”. It was created out 
of the globally shared experience of the deadlock of the UN during the differences over Iraq 
2002/2003 and the success of US-unilateralism. The UN perceived itself to be on the 
crossroads between rebirth and downfall (Annan 23.09.2003). The UN resounded 
throughout the international system. Even PR China declared the UN and multilateralism as 
an essential element of the globalising world order (Wei 2008). So did the EU. This UN-
focus was definitely created out of this atmosphere. The EU always reacts very sensitive to 
external pressure and crises, since it is a vulnerable economic power that remains in a 
very status nascendi, still searching for an external identity. Since 2008 the documents 
show a moderate rhetorical shift: After the waves of UN hysteria ebbed away and a new 
crisis, the economic breakdown in 2008 emerged, the EU concentrated more and more on 
the inter-national bilateralism, especially the relations with Obama’s USA and the new 
emerging powers (BRIC). Due to these observations one may entertain some doubt on the 
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reliability of the EU’s focus on multilateralism and the UN. The doubts are confirmed by 
studying the report about the implementation of the ESS, published in December 2009. 
Multilateralism and UN ranks second in the central chapter about the implementation of a 
more effective multilateral world order - after the US, which is called the main partner (ESS 
2009: 24). But one has to admit the UN is still within the priorities of EU’s foreign policy, 
right after the USA. 
2.2 UN touch 
The UN, especially its “face”, the UNSG, verbalise multilateralism in almost every politically 
important speech in various contexts. As the discourse analysis shows, the normative 
views of multilateralism and the UN’s place in the multilateral system are the defining 
attributes of the UN’s multilateralism. Multilateralism is used almost exclusively without an 
adjective. Sporadically the UN speaks of “effective multilateralism” and “open 
multilateralism”.  
The chapter concept is similar to the EU chapter. Firstly the normative view is presented, 
followed by the focus on the UN. The third issue deals with “open and effective 
multilateralism”, which includes the EU as partner in multilateralism. 
 
Normative view: If one asks what multilateral commitment inheres in the eyes of the UN, 
he/she will receive an answer comparable to the EU’s multilateralism, filled with “universal 
norms” such as respect for the UN Charter, for the principles and norms of international 
law, for civilian and military measures authorised by the UN (A/RES/58/317 
13.08.2004?). Multilateralism is seen as one of the main pillars of the normative global 
governance (i.e. the CGG report 1995). The SG enumerated them and mentioned 
multilateralism together with collective response, global solidarity, the rule of law and 
mutual accountability (SG/SM/10793 11.12.2006). The UN declares the need for 
multilateralism to build an equitable and democratic world order over and over again 
(E/CN.4/2005/L.73 15.04.2005). Annan put it into impressive words after the disaster 
of American unilateralism: “The choice is not between multilateralism and unilateralism. It’s 
between cooperation and catastrophe.” (SG/SM/8022 8.10.2003) These few insights 
into UN rhetoric show that the norms are of the highest importance. But this conclusion is 
not build on solid ground because it is only the first glance. The second view, when it comes 
to the UN’s role in the multilateral system, is less normative and altruistic than egocentric.  
 
The UN: The UN positions itself as irreplaceable pole of the multilateral system and 
characterises itself as the symbol of multilateralism. In the UN’s eyes there is no reason to 
doubt this position as the UN is the only universal organisation in the international system 
(A/RES/55/2 8.09.2000;A/RES/58/317 13.08.2004; A/RES/59/204 20.12.2004; 
SG in NY 18.10.2008). When the UN is in trouble, the international system is in trouble 
too; when the international system is under strain, the UN is under strain too. This logic of 
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consequences is deduced from the UN’s position. In 2003 the UN declared its decline and 
the descent of the whole multilateral system. Annan and his experts of the High Level Panel 
discussed this topic and called on the international community to engage in revitalising the 
multilateral system to revive the UN and vice versa (HLP 2004). This call for a stronger 
commitment to multilateralism that has been sounded through the UN’s halls since 2003 
is nothing less than a strategy of self-preservation. Additionally, the SG places the UN as 
the linchpin in facing the global problems: “The pendulum of history is swinging in our 
favour. Multilateralism is back. An increasingly independent world recognizes that the 
challenges of tomorrow are best dealt with through the UN. Indeed, they can only be dealt 
with through the UN.” (SG in NY 25.09.2007 and SG/SM/11236 v. 24.10.2007) His 
words illustrate the strong egocentrism that stands beyond the sermons about 
multilateralism. Surely, this instrumentalist view does not bar the norms from UN’s 
multilateralism. It does not reduce the normative weight of the UN’s touch. One has to 
notice that by strengthening the UN the multilateral norms are strengthend 
simultaneously. But some doubt remains regarding the credibility of the strong normative 
course of the UN’s multilateralism. One may find reasons to characterise the UN as a little 
(instrumentalist) wolf in (multilateralist) sheep’s clothing.  
 
Openness and effectiveness: To achieve effectiveness of its internal skeleton and its external 
actions, to consolidate its position as a linchpin of the global system, the UN needs all sorts 
of partners. Therefore the UN promotes “open multilateralism” as a multilateralism in 
which every actor, state, non-state or institution gets the chance to participate in facing the 
global challenges. (CEV/2004/HLCP/VIII/CPR.6/Add 1 and HLP 2004: 17/18). The UN 
formulates its urgent request for burden sharing and resource pooling via this positive 
connotation. To pursue its interests the UN first and foremost wants strong partners like 
the EU, especially for support in crisis management, an area in which the UN is always 
scarce. Annan refers to this UN-EU-partnership as a common destiny. He combines the 
demand with responsibility on one hand and effectiveness on the other: “As organizations, 
the United Nations and the European Union embody a belief in the power of multilateralism. 
(…) But our institutions are under strain. (…) So we share the responsibility that 
multilateralism works (…). If we are not effective, or seen as compromised, competing 
visions based in more traditional balance of power concepts would take hold.” (Ban 
26.09.2008) Effectiveness is filled with the appeals of pro-active and result-oriented 
engagement - comparable to the EU’s understanding (Ban 25.05.2008). The UN presents 
profound reasons for the EU to join the UN’s commitment in crisis management. The UN 
underlines the similar normative principles and political goals to create the picture of a 
natural UN-EU-partnership, similar to the relationship between relatives (SG/SM/9290 
5.05.2004; DSG/SM/308 15.03.2007; Ban 25.05.2008). In the eyes of the UN, UN and 
EU complement one another: “The United Nations brings to this relationship its unique 
global legitimacy and impartiality; its long standing presence (…); and its deep expertise (…). 
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The European Union brings the admirable solidarity of its citizens with the plight of the 
world’s poor and with the agenda of the United Nations. You (the EU) bring resources, 
creativity, innovation and the inspiring example of a continent that has proved the world 
that peace, stability and human security can be reached through cross-boarder 
cooperation.” (DSG/SM/207 14.03.2007) With these words the Deputy Secretary 
General gives normative as well as utilitarian reasons to join in the name of multilateralism. 
But the quote exemplifies also the high expectations regarding the power, coherency and 
effectiveness of the EU from UN side. Against this background, the EU as an unstable entity 
with no military capacities of its own, in search for internal coherence and external identity, 
must fail the reality check in the policy field of crisis management.  
 
To present the essence of the UN touch in short: Multilateralism is indispensable for the 
continuity of the UN. Strengthening the multilateral system is the way to implement the 
universal norms as much as to rebuild the UN per se. Therefore the UN’s thinking that is 
covered by the rhetorical declarations is strongly instrumental and utilitarian. 
Multilateralism is the key to an effective UN. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Both concepts deliver insights into two organisations that are perceived as the multilateral 
role models of the international system. Both the EU and the UN are seen as bonfires of 
freedom and justice, as guarantors and fighters for positive peace. The UN is the central 
civilian force. The EU has been considered as civilian power since 1972 (Duchêne 1972). 
But their way of thinking “multilateralism” is less normative than these identities promise. 
The concepts of effective multilateralism, the UN’s even more than the EU’s are created 
with a concentration upon themselves and their well-being. Multilateralism, through its 
specific interaction as well as by normative statement, is far more a mean to get what the 
organisations want than an end in itself, especially when it comes to the revival of the UN. 
The EU’s focus is less egocentric but must be seen as a response to the short-term crisis 
over Iraq. In contrast to the UN’s strong and lasting commitment to multilateralism the 
EU’s multilateral statements must be gauged as less obliging than one may assume 
without incorporating its identity. The differences in defining multilateralism may open the 
door to friction, misunderstanding and frustration on an institutional and operational level 
of UN-EU-relations. The partnership is far less natural than the rhetorical phrases give 
word to at first glance. 
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3 UN and EU in Military Crisis Management: Veritable Partners in Effective 
Multilateralism? 
The following chapter deals with the UN-EU-relations in the policy field of security with the 
example of military crisis management (CM). It is based on the theoretical and empirical 
results of analysing (effective) multilateralism. It shows whether the UN and the EU follow 
their respective understanding of multilateralism within and through their partnership or 
not. It studies all levels of UN-EU-partnership, e.g. the political level that is linked to the 
institutional one and the cooperation in peacekeeping in Africa. Due to the complexity of 
these issues combined with the widely known paper constraints, the article can to present 
only a few significant insights into the partnership.  
3.1 Political Co-operation and its Institutional Results in Crisis Management 
The lessons learnt from MONUC/Artemis 2003 and MONUC/EUFOR DR Congo 2006 
were manifested by two common political documents about EU-UN cooperation in the field 
of (military and civilian) crisis management. On 24.09.2003 the Italian Councils Presidency 
and the UN Secretary General signed the first written manifestation of their newborn co-
operation, titled “Joint declaration on EU-UN-Cooperation in Crisis Management”. The 
second document that was published on 7th June 2007 was labelled “Joint statement” for 
reason of document’s hierarchy. It repeats the main topics of 2003 at a first glance. But 
after studying it intensively and after speaking with some of the creators one notices little 
but significant differences to the 2003 paper that demonstrate the shift of the EU’s 
multilateralism. For their high level of concurrence these documents are presented 
together. 
Before introducing the main topics of the documents, the attention must be turned to the 
fact that both path-breaking papers were initiated and created by the EU, more precisely by 
the EU member states Italy (2003) and Germany (2007). CIVCOM, COREPER, PSC, 
Secretariat and Commission as well as the leading member states worked intensively on 
the draft. Their efforts were based on the EU’s former documents that dealt with the 
conceptualisation of a potential UN-EU-cooperation in crisis management. They were 
created from 2000 on. Steady inter-organisational consultations on working level and high 
level (EUHR and UNGS) have been coming along with the paper work since 2000. From 
2001 on, UNSG and PSC have been participating in the inter-organisational meetings on 
high level. The implementation of the UN-EU-declarations is verified periodically by 
substantial reports of the EU Secretariat that review the co-laboration and suggest ways to 
strengthen the relationship further.8 The UN on the other side remained in the background 
                                            
8 For example „Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis 
Management“(13609/07 16.10.2007); “CivCom advice on the paper ‘Implementation of the Joint 
Statement on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management’” (15070/07 13.11.2007); “Military Advice on 
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during preparing and formulating the declarations. From today’s standpoint it is almost 
impossible to identify the UN’s handwriting. The documents are filled with the EU’s rhetoric. 
Due to this fact it is difficult to identify the UN’s impact not only during the phase of 
preparing the documents (regarding the quality of inter-organisational exchange) but in the 
documents as well. Therefore, the chapter concentrates on the EU more than an analysis 
of co-operation may tolerate. Possible explanations of this way of task sharing between EU 
and UN are discussed at the chapters end.  
Both documents address all levels of cooperation but concentrate mostly on the 
development of the inter-institutional relations. They start with normative statements. In 
2007 the paper began with the affirmation of their “mutual commitment to an 
international order based on effective multilateralism”. The first sentences of both papers 
highlight the central position of the UN in the international system. The UN is introduced as 
the organisation with the primary responsibility and legitimacy to authorise military 
operations, which is laid down in Article 24 UN Charter. The EU pledges its support to the 
UN. To quote the EU in full: “Within this framework, the European Union reasserts its 
commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.“ In 
2007, a watchful observer identifies a little shift in the UN’s “primary” position. The 
document announces the mission of the new EU battle groups in UN-EU-crisis 
management but explains in the same breath that this EU-led mission must receive an UN 
mandate only “where appropriate”. What may one deduce from this statement? Is Article 
24 not sacrosanct anymore – even for the EU? Tardy gives a plausible explanation: “Simply 
put, the EU intends to seek a UN mandate for an EU-led operation when the operation 
contemplated is coercive (…) and/or outside Europe (…), but assumes that a UN-mandate 
is not legally required when the operation is non coercive and in Europe” (Tardy 2003: 54). 
The document includes nothing more than the Kosovo-Scenario. With regard to the strong 
commitment to the UN, the “effective multilateralism” of the EU is put into perspective. The 
question of UN-authorisation may be the litmus test of UN-EU-partnership in particular and 
effective multilateralism in general. But one has to recognise that the inclusion of such a 
scenario is a way to have the freedom to decide pragmatically when it comes to the reality 
check.  
Apart from that this issue, UN and EU agree upon a stronger and deeper 
institutionalisation at the working level and on daily basis. They plan to institutionalise a 
desk-to-desk dialogue to boost the inter-organisational learning. Since the time of 
                                                                                                                                        
‘Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management” (15451/01 
20.11.2007); “Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on EU-UN co-operation in 
crisis management” (5293/08 14.01.2008);  “Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint 
Statement on EU-UN co-operation in crisis management” (5293/1/08 28.07.2008); “Recommendations 
for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on EU-UN co-operation in crisis management” (11451/09 
29.06.2009). 
 
 16 
publication, a wide network between the various EU- and UN-organs at high level and the 
bureaucracy at low level has been established. A stronger cooperation in planning the 
operations, in communication at all levels and at all times of a mission, a joint instruction of 
the mission’s staff and best practices was laid down in the documents as well. These 
measures were the direct outcome from the lessons identified during the operations in the 
DR Congo.  
All in all, one has to conclude that the content of these documents is thin. But put in 
contrast to the recent NATO-UN declarations on crisis management as well as the AU-UN 
statements the result is satisfying. Moreover, the EU went concrete steps to build on that 
outcome and to make further suggestions to strengthen the partnership. For instance, the 
EU defined its own list of objectives for an effective common crisis management, which are 
implemented in the field missions.  
 
As stated in the beginning of the chapter the EU was the catalyst and promoter of these 
political declarations. It made a veritable effort to deepen the ties between the partners as 
well. Practitioners who were part of the preparation processes confirmed the EU’s role as 
a lone fighter for the institutionalisation of the UN-EU-relations. The UN, however was 
reluctant at this level of the relationship.  
“Effective multilateralism” may explain the behaviour of both partners:  
The EU learnt that institutionalisation enhances effectiveness by its successful experiences 
with multilateralism during its long history of integration. It simplifies coordination and 
stimulates cooperation. The EU experienced, that in the end long standing co-operation on 
the basis of diffuse reciprocity is a profitable way. For this reason, the EU includes its 
internal politics of institutional integration in its external identity (intern-extern-analogy). 
Therefore, the EU is eager to build confident, long lasting partnerships with all its allies, the 
NATO and AU as well as the UN. Especially in the new field of CM the EU longs for such an 
institutional network, perceived as the reliable basis of its actions. In the end, by mutual 
exchange and deepened institutional ties multilateralism becomes more effective. 
The UN on the other side does not give much attention to constant exchange and 
institutionalisation. It concentrates on the present crisis situation and prefers ad-hoc 
collaboration with regional organisations (Fawcett 2003: 16; Pugh/Sidhu 2003: 1). It is 
not in its interest to engage exclusively. It is not in its mindset to strengthen all the ties with 
all its possible partners. Some solid arguments must be made against a commitment to 
one special partner and/or deeper institutionalisation in the eyes of the UN: 1) as linchpin 
organisation in CM the UN can (try to) choose out of a range of partners if it is in need for 
task sharing, burden sharing or resource pooling. In the past it reverted to nation-led 
coalitions of the willing, NATO or operated alone. 2) In the UN’s perception, the UN-EU-
relations are covered already through Chapter VIII UN-Charter. The UN perceives the EU as 
a regional partner. In the UN’s logic there is no reason to go a Sonderweg with the EU via 
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such documents like the declarations.9 3) In order not to risk the decline of its position in 
CM as nucleus of international CM the UN tries to avoid durable relationships with 
organisations that may have the effect of demonstrating the chronic weakness of the UN 
peacekeeping. With organisations that are weaker than the UN, it is the promoter of such 
declarations.10 It perceives itself as the player who has to strengthen these organisations, 
e.g. the AU. 4) In 2003, when the declaration was published, the UN had first and foremost 
to understand the EU’s new role as a military and civilian crisis manager. The GSDP was 
operational in 2003 for the first time ever. In the decades before the EU was no player in 
peacekeeping. Therefore one may argue it was the EU’s responsibility to offer or to allocate 
its new instruments to the UN. 5) At last, the question rises who or which organ shall 
initiate such a declaration or the institutionalisation within the UN. The UN bureaucracy is 
overstretched. It is a way of task sharing that the EU initiated. 
 
All things considered, the EU fulfilled its promise to strengthen the international 
organisations via veritable multilateralism with these declarations. They must be seen as a 
complement to the cooperation at political and operational level. The UN was passive, but 
pursuing multilateralism in the UN’s sense too. The UN recognised that these political and 
institutional commitments had no immediate positive impact on the UN’s status. So it took 
a backseat. But in contrast to the EU, since it is not eager to institutionalise the inter-
organisational relations, the UN did not act multilaterally in Ruggie’s understanding. It 
seems that the UN concentrates more on immediate gains than on the outcome of long 
standing relations based on diffuse reciprocity.  
3.2 Examples of Co-operative Operational Military Crisis Management 
The next step is to study the quality of “effective multilateralism” at the operational level of 
the UN-EU relations in military crisis management. The article concentrates on the 
conceptualisation of cooperation in the field.11 It passes on the analyses of the inter-
organisational decision and planning processes as well as of the informational and personal 
exchange during co-operation even though they show the high complexity of inter-
organisational multi-level governance, the various conflict lines and sources of rivalry and 
mismanagement. But the results of these studies are less significant regarding “effective 
multilateralism” than the operational concepts. 
                                            
9 But there is a rub in UN-EU-relations, which the UN may not have noticed yet. The classification as a 
“regional organisation” does not fit for the EU that operates in the middle of Africa. Additionally, the EU does 
not identify itself as a regional organisation only but a global one, in geographical and political spheres. Unlike 
other organisations, e.g. the AU, the NATO or ASEAN, the EU perceives itself as a global actor who thinks and 
operates globally. 
10 See i.e. A/RES/61/296 5.10.2007. 
11 The field level, that is of utmost interest as well, was analysed in my GRASP-working paper (see references).  
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To gauge the quality of “effective multilateralism”, one has to operationalise the meaning of 
“effective multilateralism” in this context. After that the concepts of co-operation are 
presented. Some examples give further insights into the co-operation in DR Congo and 
Chad/CAR.  
3.2.1 “Effective multilateral” crisis management 
To begin with the UN-touch, the UN, eager to be strengthened it its most pressing issue, 
the peacekeeping, identifies the cooperation in line with “multilateralism” if the EU shares 
burdens with the UN. Thus the key to multilateralism is the question whether the EU is a 
veritable supporter of the UN’s peacekeeping. Additionally, the UN aims to preserve its 
central role as the world’s peacekeeper. Therefore it avoids a concept of operation that 
looks like the EU is replacing the UN. The UN underlines its autonomy as well. It is not ready 
to agree upon a concept that reduces its visibility and legitimacy. It accepts no cooperation 
that shows the weakness of UN peacekeeping. Apart from the self-centered model of 
multilateralism, the object to secure a conflict region is an effort in the name of 
multilateralism as well.  
The EU’s touch of multilateralism applied to crisis management fits with the UN’s interests 
in principal. The EU promises to strengthen the UN in its most challenging policy field, the 
peacekeeping. It emphasises in various documents that it must not risk replacing the UN 
through its commitment to and within the UN. The EU is also keen to secure the 
international environment and asks if the outcome of a mission will be a win for the 
multilateral system. Apart from the focus on the UN, the commitment must fulfil the rules 
of effectiveness. The mission must have the capabilities and facilities as well as the 
mandate for the EU to be a reliable partner for the weakened UN. It has to have these 
means to be accepted by the EU member states that watch the new GSDP efforts critically 
as well. It has to have the military power to act decisively to not risk the life of EU troops and 
to save the image of a successful GSDP. It must be pro-active in building a safe and secure 
environment or filling a security vacuum. The adjective “effective” includes the fact that the 
setting must assure to have an impact on the conflict solution. That is a pre-condition to 
even think about planning a GSDP mission. In short: the co-operation must warrant the EU’s 
success. Moreover, the EU’s concept is oriented on increased benefits of the inter-
organisational work. Thus duplication in the field or unnecessary doubled bureaucracy must 
be strictly avoided, as stated in a paper of the EU Secretariat, which was discussed with the 
UNUSG of the UNDPKO already in 2001 (9526/1/01 REV 1 11.06.2001: 48/49). At 
least, the operation must contribute to the EU’s external identity. The EU has to position 
itself in the system of security governance too. Therefore, the EU must be visible and its 
autonomy must be safeguarded (9526/1/01 REV 1 11.06.2001: 48/49). The Council 
exemplified “autonomy” in 2001 in a paper about UN-EU relations in crisis management 
and conflict prevention: “no automatic supply, cooperation on case-by-case, (…) PSC political 
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control and strategic direction, no instantly deployable resources, etc.” (12969/01: §4, 
7.11.2001). Like the UN, the EU is focused on its own benefit and costs.   
3.2.2 The concepts of co-operation 
The missions’ concepts are based on models that were invented by the EU in its report “EU-
UN Co-operation in military crisis management operations – Elements of implementation of 
the EU-UN-joint Declaration” (9638 9.06.2004), which recurred mostly on the Swedish 
presidential Non-Paper of 2001 (8533/01 ANNEX 10.05.2001), the Council’s decision at 
the Gothenburg Summit (SN 200/1/01 REV 1 15./16.06.2001) and the Council’s 
Document 12969/01, dealing with EU-UN relations in crisis management and conflict 
prevention (12969/01 7.11.2001). The graphic shows the variations in EU operations 
and the concepts of UN-EU co-operation: 
 
 
As my analysis focuses on the dyade between EU and UN a case was selected if it met the 
criteria of pure inter-organisational co-operation. The criteria are as follows:  
1) The UN subcontracts the GSDP mission. In contrast to the first option that existed 
before the EU’s integration into security policy via national support to UN troops, the 
subcontracting model emerged with the development of the GSDP. The central 
argument for sub-contracting is the political authority that remains in the hands of 
the  PSC. In option I the political authority lies in the hands of the UNSG. The 
subcontracting has been discussed since the end of bipolarity, especially after the 
proposal of a Regional-Global-Peace-Mechanism in 2000 (…). A motive to choose 
option II might be mistrust in the leadership qualities of the UN Secretariat 
(Novossellof 2004: 6). Anyway it answers to the EU’s interest to guard its recently 
won authority in security policy.  
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2) The mission must be led by the EU to speak of UN-EU-cooperation in the field.  
3) It must be labelled EU-mission to the core. Therefore must be free of NATO assets.  
4) The GSDP mission operates parallel to an UN mission in the field.  
This case was met in DR Congo 2003 and 2006 as well as in Chad/CAR 2008/09. 
The graphic presents two ways for the EU, to support the UN: the “over the horizon 
capacities on standby” and the “bridging an UN operation”. The standby-model was invented 
by the UNDPKO as an answer to the crises in Africa. The EU Council criticised it as too 
complex and challenging with regard to the inter-organisational co-ordination. It was 
evaluated as ineffective. Nevertheless, it became reality in Congo 2006. The bridging model 
includes the rapid deployment of EU troops. This was the concept of Artemis/MONUC in 
2003 and Chad/MINURCAT 2008/09. In such a case, the EU troops function as a bridge 
for an UN mission to gain time for a (re-)deployment of UN peacekeepers or the (re-
)organisation of the UN operation. It ends when the redeployment or reorganisation of the 
UN mission is implemented (but not necessarily completed). In contrast to usual peace 
operation schedules, the end-date is oriented on the end-state of the UN, not on the 
situation in the theatre. This model answers to the recent developments in peace 
operations. Tardy observed an specific burden-sharing between the UN and the regional 
organisation which is applicable to the UN-EU task-sharing as well: the regional 
organisations “go first to a crisis zone for a limited period of time before the UN takes over 
for a longer term.” (Tardy 2005: 62)12 The bridging model opens the possibility to re-hat the 
EU troops to the UN peacekeeping mission. Both models were implemented during the EU-
UN cooperation in DR Congo and Chad/CAR, even though if the co-operation in Chad/CAR 
is a special case.  
 
See the chart that shows the data and main facts of the co-operative missions: 
 
 MONUC/Artemis 2003 MONUC/EUFOR DRC 
2006 
MINURCAT/EUFOR 
Chad/CAR 2008/09 
Concept of Co-
operation 
Subcontracting model 
 
Autonomous operations 
 
Missions operate 
simultaneously 
 
MONUC started before 
Artemis, in 1999 
 
Artemis as robust mission 
 
Artemis as bridge builder to 
a reinforced MONUC 
 
Artemis as supporter of the 
MONUC/URUBATT 
contingent 
Subcontracting model 
 
Autonomous operations 
 
Missions operate 
simultaneously 
 
MONUC started before 
EUFOR, in 1999 
 
EUFOR as robust mission 
 
EUFOR as over the horizon 
force (in Libreville/Gabun) 
 
EUFOR as supporter of 
MONUC with quick reaction 
capabilities 
Subcontracting model 
 
Autonomous operations 
 
Missions operate 
simultaneously 
 
The missions started at 
the same time 
 
EUFOR as robust mission 
 
EUFOR as bridge builder 
to MINURCAT II 
 
EUFOR as military 
supporter of the civilian 
MINURCAT 
 
                                            
12 One has to reiterate that the UN has to operate parallel with the EU not after the EU ended its mission. 
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EUFOR as military 
component of the civilian 
MINURCAT I 
 
Troop strength in 
theatre of 
cooperation 
MONUC/URUBATT: 700 
troops 
Artemis: 2.000 troops 
MONUC: 16.297 troops 
EUFOR: 2.118 troops 
MINURCAT: 1.549 civilian 
personell (police included) 
and 50 military liaison 
officers 
EUFOR: 3.400 troops 
(3.700 mandated) 
Time of coop. 12th June – 1th September  29th July – 30th November March 2008 – March 
2009 
Location of coop. Bunia, capital of Ituri DRC without the Northeast, 
esp. Kinshasa 
Borders to Sudan in Chad 
and CAR 
SC mandate of co-
operation 
S/RES/1484 20.05.2003 
S/RES/1493 28.07.2003 
S/RES/1501             
12.08.2003 
 
S/RES/1671 
25.04.2006 
S/RES/1778 
25.09.2007 
S/RES/1861 
14.01.2009 
  
These concepts of cooperation inherit some of the main elements of “effective 
multilateralism”. They create a task and role sharing that avoids the duplication of efforts 
as well as the replacement of the UN. The pattern of burden sharing remains the same: 
The UN is the longstanding and multidimensional stabilisation force; the EU is the short-
term and robust emergency force. This is a solid fundament for a mission’s success.  
3.2.3 Insights in the co-operation  
But the co-operation in DR Congo and Chad/CAR had some deficits in “effective 
multilateralism”. Without going into details, three short examples are presented here. Two 
of them deal with the situation at the end of the co-operation. 13The third example shows 
the EU’s behaviour when the operation is not show promising results. 
Example 1: The priority of the end-date 
The EU-operations in DR Congo were criticised for their concentration on the end date of 
the mission since this way the EU risked the security of MONUC and the Congolese 
population as well as the success of the co-operation. In 2003, as Artemis began to 
withdraw its troops within its schedule, MONUC was not in a position to take over from 
Artemis. Therefore Artemis risked a huge security vacuum in a very unstable environment. 
Although Artemis helped MONUC to implement its DDR measures during the three month 
of co-operation and to build up security, it preferred to “send the boys back home” on time. 
The EU did not even think of extending the end-date for a few weeks even if this was 
discussed by some northern EU member states and NGO’s. The quality of its 
multilateralism must be questioned. In 2006 the EU acted the same way in a different 
setting. During its co-operation with MONUC it supported the latter in its efforts to build a 
stable and secure environment during the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
                                            
13 For additional information about the co-operation in DRC, see for intance: BERCI 2005, Boshoff 2004, 
Gegout 2005, Haine/Giegerich 2006, Homann 2007, Jacob 2008, Major 2008, Scheuermann 2010. 
About the co-operation in Chad/CAR, see: Arteaga 2008, Ehrhart 2008a/2008b/2009, Frenken 2008, 
Helly 2010, Mattealer 2008. 
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MONUC and EUFOR worked together smoothly, even during the riots that occurred in 
August and November. As an officer of the EUFOR mentioned during interviews, the EU 
looked out to respect the UN’s field of activities for matters of non-duplication and non-
replacement. The Concept of Operation made clear that the EU must act robustly only if the 
UN would ask for support. There was a clear hierarchy, a clear line of activity that was 
respected by both partners: the UN comes first, supported first and foremost by the 
National Army. But this undisturbed partnership ended when the EU began to withdraw its 
troops in a critical phase of the run-off ballot. Riots broke out, but EUFOR went home. 
Politicians of UN and EU as well as the Congolese Presidential Candidate and various 
influential NGO appealed to the normative duty of the EU to extend its mandate. But the end 
date had priority over the end state.  
 
Example 2: The Re-hat 
Since the EU was not extending its operation, the UNSG and some EU member states 
asked for the re-hat of EU troops to MONUC in 2003 and 2006. In both cases, the EU sent 
the demand to the member states that were contributing troops to EUFOR. They had to 
decide about the re-hat on national level. But every member state denied the UN’s request 
for help. With a closer look at the participation of EU member states in UN peacekeeping 
operations this reaction was not surprising. The EU member states are the most reluctant 
troop contributors of all member states of the UN. They doubt the regime of UN 
peacekeeping. They find no reason to operate in a zone of non-vital interest, first of all in 
Africa. They concentrate on their commitment to NATO and EU. Only nations with special 
interests in the Africa and the pro-active neutral and northern states join UN peacekeeping, 
in a noteworthy way. But in this special case, where the member states were already in 
theatre and the effort to re-hat was marginal, rejecting the request to re-hat weakened the 
credibility of the EU’s commitment to the UN as the multilateral lichpin. A re-hat would have 
strengthened the system of UN peacekeeping directly, not only indirectly as inter-
organisational co-operation does.  
In 2009, most member states of EUFOR CAR/Chad re-hatted as the military element of 
MINURCAT was in delay. Big contributors like France re-hatted for the critical phase only, 
some of the member states were contributors until the missions end date. There was no 
discussion in the EU regarding the possibility of rejection. As France declared its readiness 
to re-hatt, the other EUFOR members joined in. Without EUFOR’s re-hatting the military 
arm of MINURCAT, which saved the lifes of civilians, the safe return of thousands of 
refugees as well as the security of the sandy borders to Sudan would have never existed.  
 
Example 3: The EU says “No!” 
The third example deals with a request of the UNSG that was rejected by the EU. The 
UNSG asked for support to MONUC in a conflict in the North-Kivu that escalated in autumn 
2006. The stream of refugees and IDPs and the level of the violence overextended the 
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MONUC. It tried to safeguard the population from violence, but became a target of the 
rebels attack itself. MONUC was not prepared to act as a robust enforcement force. The 
Indian Commander of MONUC in the North-Kivu said in 2008: “I have not been equipped to 
fight. If I am going to fight, I need an expeditionary force.” (in Boucher 2008) The UN called 
for support for over two years. The UNSG as well as its Special Representative in DR Congo 
requested a quick reaction force to function as a bridge builder for a reinforced MONUC 
(that was authorised already). But the EU refused to help. The “No” was a result of friction 
within the EU. Almost no member state agreed to participate in such an operation. 
Therefore, the international community questioned the credibility of the EU’s 
multilateralism. The criticisms were based on the fact that the EU was the player who had 
the experience of two military missions (one in the Northeast!) and two ongoing civilian-
military missions, EUSEC and EUPOL, in DRC. It was the player who had the battle groups 
on standby as well. Therefore, one might assume, it was in EU’s duty to act in support of 
the UN. 
But are these criticisms relevant regarding the “effective multilateralism”? The answer is 
“yes”, when argued with “multilateralism”. Focusing on the noun “multilateralism” one has to 
notice that the “No” breaks the promise to strengthen the UN if it is in need. It is not in line 
with the EU’s vow to build a peaceful world order. But including the adjective “effective” the 
“No” makes sense. The EU’s analysis of the situation, especially the visit of Kouchner to the 
region (who is seen as the initiator of the request first and foremost), showed a picture of a 
conflict where the concept of a bridging operation had no impact on resolving the conflict. 
Moreover, the EU would have had to risk the lives of their troops in North-Kivu. Therefore 
most member states rejected the request. The EU stated also, that there was enough 
external support in North Kivu. It called on the internal and regional actors to activate their 
capacities for solving the conflict. A military EU commitment would have been 
counterproductive since the internal players were off the hook of taking responsibility for 
their very own problem. All in all, the EU said “No” because here “multilateralism” had no 
chance to be “effective”.  
Conclusion 
The analysis aimed to challenge the UN’and EU’s commitment to “effective multilateralism” 
via the inter-organisational partnership in the policy field of crisis management. Based on 
the theoretical definition of multilateralism and the operationalisation of “effective 
multilateralism” it was asked whether the inter-organisational co-operation in crisis 
management was in line with “multilateralism” or not. In chapter 1 it became clear that 
multilateralism is not only a specific way to interact, but also an element of an identity. 
Therefore EU and UN are perceived as identities who act not only multilateral for 
instrumental reasons but in principal. Moreover, they are perceived as players who link 
multilateralism to the normative global governance. In this view, multilateralism has a 
positive impact on the international system and becomes an end in itself.  
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Chapter 2 focused on the EU’s and UN’s meaning of “(effective) multilateralism”. Both 
actors declared multilateralism as one of their major political objects and used it to label 
their partnership. On one side, the analysis showed that both actors understand 
multilateralism as a component of their identity, as a central element of their political 
norms and goals and therefore as an end in itself that must be pursued. On the other side, 
multilateralism, combined with the adjective “effective” by the EU, was identified as an 
instrument and means to enforce vital interests of the UN and the EU. The UN used the 
term to call for its revival even more than the EU. The line of argument shifted from the 
constructivist and normative content, to which one ties the UN and EU at first glance, to 
the instrumental and utilitarian content, which was the driving force to inter-act 
multilaterally, as postulated by Keohane as well as Ruggie. On the basis of these results the 
question of the quality of “effective multilateralism”, especially with regard to the balance 
between the normative and the utilitarian sides of multilateralism, became important even 
more.  
Chapter 3 gave insights into the political and institutional as well as the operational level of 
the co-operation in crisis management. At all levels of the partnership both organisations 
demonstrated that the utilitarian cost-benefit analyses rank before normative motives, even 
when the organisations act in the name of multilateralism.  
To speak in the words of the EU, “effectiveness” is the litmus test when it comes to inter-
organisational cooperation, not “multilateralism”.  
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